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BOOK REVIEWS
THE CARELESS ATOM. By Sheldon Novick. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1969. Pp. x, 225. $5.95.
Atomic energy as a source of electricity is invading America like
the proverbial "mindless horde." "[Als of September 30, 1968,
there were 86 nuclear power plants under construction or in the
planning stage in the United States."1  By 1980, nuclear power is
expected to provide 37 percent of our total electrical capacity and
by the commencement of the 21st century it will provide over half
our total capacity. 2 Our rivers, streams, and lakes, now choked
with every imaginable form of pollution, will be further burdened
with discharges of the myriad radioactive waste products as well as
vast quantities of thermally polluted water." In The Careless Atom
Sheldon Novick deals primarily with the nuclear dangers of atomic
powered generating plants, demonstrating that these plants are not
safe, and that the utility industry is being allowed to profit by mak-
ing the American people the victims of their experimental tech-
nology.
Initially, Mr. Novick4 points out that nuclear generating plant ac-
cidents do occur, and that the effects of such incidents can be ex-
tremely dangerous. For example, the total radioactive release from
the Windscale generator accident in England was one-tenth of that
released at Hiroshima.5 More frightening, however, are the accounts
of how accidents that could have been major catastrophes have been
averted by what can only be characterized as luck. As an increasing
number of reactors are constructed, the law of probability can be ex-
pected to change this luck to disaster.
1 C EHNs COMITTEE TO SAVE CAYUGA LAKE, RADIOAcTIvITY AND A PRO-
PosED POWER PLANT ON CAYUGA LAYE, Nov. 22, 1968, at 3, citing R. Lyerly & W.
Mitchell, 1967, Nuclear Power Plants, U.S.A.E.C., Wash., D.C.
2Id.
3 Nuclear plants are less heat efficient (largely because of operation at lower steam
pressure for safety reasons), and thus produce about 40 percent more heat than an
equivalent coal-fired plant. Economic considerations encourage large plants in the 1
million kilowatt or larger range. For a discussion of the effects of thermal pollution,
see Reitze, Wastes, Water, and Wishful Thinking: The Battle of Lake Erie, 20 CASE
W. REs. L REv. 5, at 38 (1968). See also Di Luzio, Water Use and Thermal Pollution,
POWER ENGINEEMG, June 1968, at 44; Trembly, Effects of Cooling Water From
Steam.Electric Power Plants on Stream Biota, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTI-, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, BIOLOGICA.L PROBLEMS IN WATER POLLUTION 334 (1962).
4 Mir. Novick has been involved in the work of the Committee for Environmental
Information of Washington University. This organization is responsible for the ex-
cellent magazine Environment formerly known as Scientist and Citizen.
5S. Novcx, THE CARELESS ATOM 10 (1969).
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The author presents a historical and scientific explanation of
how the nuclear power industry achieved its present position, and
the potential danger of these plants. Basic research, carried on by
the government as part of its military program of World War II,
combined with private power interests' fear that the government
would enter the power business led the utility companies to fight
for the right to use this technology for commercial power genera-
tion. The reader is impressed by the many parallels between atomic
energy development and the program for universal dissemination
of pesticides. The problems caused by both stem from government
research and development which at the end of World War II left
this country in possession of a nascent technology that could be used
for beneficial nonmilitary purposes, but also had the potential for
large scale harm. Ignorance of the fundamental dangers of this
technology was compounded by the delay between the application
of the technology and the much later discovery of irrevocable dam-
age.6
The historical perspective is necessary -to appreciate the power of
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and lack of effective govern-
mental control over the agency. Created by the exigencies of war,
the AEC has operated in secrecy and with virtually limitless power.
After the war it continued to operate primarily as a research organ-
ization and as a promotion agent for the utility industry - often
with a rakish disinterest in public welfare. Many of us still remem-
ber the pronouncements and publications of the AEC during the
decade of the 50's when they assured the public that there was vir-
tually no danger to humans from the fallout of nuclear testing.7
The AEC's power to classify information was an effective method
by which the public was kept in ignorance of the potential dangers
of radioactive energy.' From Mr. Novick's discussion, their mis-
representation of nuclear dangers seems to have continued to the
present. For example, the author examines the problems of geology
as it affects the safety of nuclear reactors and shows that plans for
nuclear facilities to be located along the San Andreas fault can be
approved in California.' Additionally, and even more serious than
the location, is the design of the reactor. Many reactor systems
operate under high pressure and temperature. A variety of chemi-
6 See generally R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1964).
7See B. COMMONER, SCIENCE & SURVIVAL 16 (1966).
81d. at 91.
9 S. NOVICK, supra note 5, at 34.
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cal reactions with other metals used in the construction of the reactor
are possible, as is the danger that the properties of the metals coming
in contact with radioactivity will change, often becoming brittle.
The author indicates that there is simply a lack of technological
knowledge in this area. The result could be devastating. It is in-
teresting to note how often the limits of technology are used to
justify inaction regarding air and water pollution: abatement. Yet,
regarding nuclear power generation, it is full steam ahead. Why?
The primary reason is that the public utilities industry has been
given statutory authority to gamble with the lives of Americans
without having any financial responsibilities for their errors beyond
their insurance coverage. The Price-Anderson Art allows the tax-
payer to subsidize the industry by providing low cost federal insur-
ance not to exceed $500 million beyond that available from private
industry.10 The facts are, however, that the combined insurance in-
dustry of the Western World has been willing to insure the nuclear
generating industry for only $74 million. They consider the activ-
ities of the power industry too dangerous." An accident could eas-
ily produce property damage vastly in excess of insurance coverage
and the cost in human lives would be incalcuable. Further encour-
agement to the power companies' avoidance of safety precautions
seems to flow from court decisions rejecting strict liability.' 2 Thus,
the health and safety of the citizenry is gambled, and the utilities
can only win, for the taxpayer takes the 'risk. As long as he sur-
vives he continues to pay his electric bill.
This has led ,to two dangerous developments. First, the size of
reactors has grown very rapidly. As the size is increased the techno-
logical problems related to safety are also increased. Thus, while a
100,000 kilowatt unit can be designed to contain an accidental ex-
plosion, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to do so in a 500,000
kilowatt plant - -the approximate size necessary to economically
compete with existing coal generating plants. Yet, a nuclear 'plant
to be constructed for TVA will have a capacity of 2,196,000 kilo-
watts.3 The modern nuclear generating facilities being constructed
or designed are at least 10 years ahead of the ability to create safe
plants, and little protection is provided by the government because
1042 U.S.C. § 2210 (1964).
3. S. Novicic, supra note 5, at 72.
12 See Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1356 (1968).
1 3 0'Hanlon, An Atomic Bomb in the Land of Coal, FORTuN13, Sept. 1966, at 132.
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the federal agencies responsible for assuring the safety of the reac-
tor program are themselves its architects. 4
Secondly, the absence of financial responsibility for a nuclear ac-
cident has led electric utilities to seek locations close to population
centers so as to minimize transmission costs. Consolidated Edison
has made numerous proposals to place nuclear generating facilities
in and around New York City.' 5 An 800,000 kilowatt plant is
planned for the shore of Lake Erie about 25 miles east of Toledo. 8
The inhabitants of these communities are the caged, mice. These
experiments will show whether nuclear power plants can be oper-
ated so as not to destroy the population. The proposed Ohio plant
will be only a short distance from the Enrico Fermi plant at La-
goona Beach, Michigan. That plant, the only commercial fast
breeder,17 after years of malfunctioning, had a serious accident on
October 5, 1966. The accident put the reactor out of commission
but could have easily killed a large portion of the population of
Detroit.' 8
In spite of the danger, the federal government continues to
spend money to encourage the construction of nuclear reactors.
Why any reasonable man would want a nuclear reactor anywhere
on this earth is one of those mysteries that perhaps will be answered
only by whatever species replaces man. A single 1,000,000 kilo-
watt reactor, after 1-year of operation, contains more radioactive
strontium, cesium, and ,iodine than was released in all the nuclear
weapons tests conducted in the world until the present. 9 There ex-
ists little reason for hope that this radiation will remain isolated
from man's ecosystem. Discharges of radioactive materials into
the air and water can be expected from even normal operations, and
small discharges can cause great harm since radioactive material,
like pesticides, is concentrated in the body of those living things oc-
cupying the contaminated environment. Each creature receives the
lifetime accumulation of those life forms comprising its diet thereby
producing a biological magnification of 'the contaminant. Because
of this, soft parts of oysters and scallops have been shown to concen-
14 S. NOVICK, supra note 5, at 89.
15 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1969, § 2, at 88, col. 3; id., Jan. 11, 1968, § 1, at
17, col. 1.
16 12 GREAT LAxEs NEws LETTER No. 3, Jan.-Feb. 1968.
'
7 Fast breeders burn plutonium which they also produce thus obviating the need
for enriched uranium 235.
Is S. NOVICK, supra note 5, at 156-58.
19 Id. at 94.
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trate radioactive zinc 65 to levels as much as 100 times those in their
sea water environment within several days after exposure.20 In the
bones of fish, radioactive strontium can increase to a level 2,000
times greater than that of the surrounding water.21 This radioacti-
vity is getting into our habitat. The radionuclides are discharged in-
to the cooling water and then into our rivers and lakes. There it is
concentrated in the bodies of the indigenous fish, plants, and ani-
mals. With the help of birds and the wind the radioactivity can be
disseminated around the world. This discharge is considered nor-
mal. Any serious accident can add much greater quantities of long-
lived radioactive material to our environment. As the number and
size of the nuclear plants increase - so does the risk.
We can only anticipate a constantly increasing level of radio-
activity and commensurate harm to humans. Moreover, this radio-
activity is not rendered harmless except after many years of slow de-
terioration. The half-life of the cesium 137 released to our waters
is 30 years. Hydrogen 3 released to the air by nuclear reactor oper-
ations has a half-life of 12.26 years.2 Unless it can be stopped, the
utility industry can be expected to produce a pollution problem
which will be impossible to abate. Present safety plans will not
prevent radioactivity from contaminating the earth, but rather are
designed to spread the radioactivity evenly so all people can be sub-
jected to a constantly increasing low level exposure. The industry
hopes that only long term statistical evidence of the incidence of
cancer or genetic change would indicate the harm which they will
inflict upon mankind. It seems ironic that atomic energy is sold to
the public as a panacea for air pollution control, when what really
is planned is to substitute deadly radioactive wastes for -the less
deadly, though certainly harmful, sulfur oxides and particulate mat-
ter.
Perhaps man will come to his senses and halt his insane drive to-
ward extinction. His lemming-like behavior makes it unlikely that
man will change, but the urge to survive seems to create enough op-
timism to have knowledgeable people try to sound the alarm. The
same technocrats who brought us air and water pollution as the
price for our highly consumptive society are now trying to force nu-
clear power on the country. With effort this can be prevented or
.20W. Brngs, Distribution of Cobalt 60, Zinc 65, Strontium 85, and Cesium 137
in a Freshwater Pond, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, Pub.
No. 999 RH 24, at 29 (1967).
21 S. NovicK, supra note 5, at 97.
2 2 CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO SAvE CAYUGA LAKE, supra note 1, at 7.
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at least controlled so as to insure basic environmental protection.
The nuclear station at Easton, on the Hudson River in New York
was cancelled.2 3 The Cayuga Lake, New York plant was cancelled
at least temporarily - hopefully forever.24 Now our abused Lake
Erie is to be subjected to another serious source of pollution for
Toledo Edison plans to build a large nuclear power plant northeast
of Oak Harbor on the shore of Lake Erie near the mouth of the
Toussaint River.
With many other plants now being planned for the Great Lakes
Basin as well as all other areas of the Nation, Mr. Novick's book is
especially timely and its contents should be known by all citizens.
His contribution is particularly valuable for he presents a complex
subject in a manner that any reader can comprehend. If we, by de-
fault, allow the AEC and the utility industry to make the decision
for us, then, all mankind will suffer. The tyranny of our technol-
ogy can only be controlled by a citizenry that understands the is-
sues involved in the decisions of modern government and industry.
For -too long we -have lived with a society -that allows ,these complex
decisions affecting our environment to be made by the "experts,"
and these experts have generally been wrong.
ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR.*
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS. By Rudolf B. Schlesinger. Dobbs
Ferry, New York: Oceana 1968. Pp. xv, 1727, 2 vols. $35.00.
Abstracting universals from written opinions is a familiar and en-
trenched characteristic of the common law system. Despite the fa-
miliarity of its presence, abstractionism has proved to be a demand-
ing and a frustrating exercise, capable of evoking uneven responses
from the legal community. It has been over-absorbed, as in the
mechanical jurisprudence of the early part of the century, and it has
been the object of sharp criticism, particularly by the realists. Re-
gardless of the accompanying tensions, the abstractive process, by
furnishing a unifying ground of comprehension, constitutes the pro-
creant essence of the decision-making process. The establishment of
coherent perimeters of comprehension has a consequence that is
relevant to comparative law. Abstractionism furnishes the com-
23 N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1968, § C, at 26, col. 1.
24 Wall Street Journal, Apr. 14, 1969, at 7, col. 1.
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
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parativist with a framework within which legal systems can be ana-
lyzed.
There are at least two methods by which legal systems can be
abstracted and compared. One method identifies the styles and
techniques that each of the systems invokes in the problem solving
process, and the other, by establishing and defining an equivalency
of rules and standards, focuses on the solutions to specific problems.
Professor Schlesinger and his eight project colleagues have applied
the latter approach to the field of contracts. Encompassing 10 legal
systems, the study is an ambitious undertaking with a wide range of
objectives. Not only does the project envision the determination of
a common core of contract solutions, but it is also designed to de-
velop research methodology, to serve as a basis for curriculum
changes, to provide norms for use by international tribunals, to be
used as an aid in international arbitration and international trade
and investment, and to serve as a source of reforms for new coun-
tries creating systems of law.
A threshold question concerns the choice of subject area. Why
contracts, and why formation of contracts? As to the initial ques-
tion the reasons given are two: First, contracts is both a distinct and
universal field; secondly, -it is an area of "great practical impor-
tance."1  Formation was chosen because of its relative immunity
from the excluding thrust of the ubiquitous standardized contract
and because "the legal rules embodied in diverse legal systems are
much less likely to be displaced by the parties' autonomous arrange-
ments than in other areas of contract law.' 2
Those engaged in teaching contracts are particularly sensitive to
the implications raised by these assumptions. The relevance of the
overall field of contract law to the commercial scene is at present
the subject of concern and dispute.. There is argument to the effect
that contract doctrine .exerts only a minimal .impact on business de-
cision-making.3 The advocates of this view contend that exigencies
of trade do not permit the accommodation of business negotiations
and transactions- to contract dogma. Moreover, even assuming that
some degree of relevance does exist, how, to What extent, and in
what areas, is it manifested?
The major obstacle to reasonably accurate answers to these ques-
tions is to be found in the dearth of extant empirical research. A
11 . SCHLESINGER, FoRMATIoN OF CoNTRAcrs 18 (1968).
2 1d. at 20.
3 See Friedman & Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present, and
Future, 1967 Wis. L REv. 805.
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paucity that is not, it might be added, necessarily restricted to the
field of contracts.4 Primary research is still oriented around appel-
late decisions. The West Reporter system serves as the focal point
of inquiry. Unfortunately, published opinions reflect at best a mi-
nute and perhaps inaccurate portion of the adversary drama. In-
dustry pressures, goodwill factors, and custom may make litigation
unattractive. Many conflicts are, therefore, channeled into arbitra-
tion. Moreover, if and when the litigation process begins, this new
environment reshapes the problem so as to make it conform with
patterns already recognizable by courts. Even the recent surge of
realism into jurisprudential cognition has effected minimal change
in the appellate syndrome.
' In addition to the difficulty of ascertaining the quality of the
nexus between contract dogma and commercial reality there is also
the question of sphere of influence. It has been suggested that the
reach of the field of contracts has been greatly diluted.5 When
areas such as antitrust law, labor law, and insurance law" have be-
come sufficiently important in terms of social impact, they have been
chopped off from contracts and given independent recognition.7
The above comments are by no means fatal to the decision by
the authors of Formation of Contracts to focus on contracts. In the
absence of more empirical data it would be imprudent to summarily
dismiss the relevance of written opinions. They do, as a matter of
fact, contain measurable vibrations of commercial reality. Not in-
frequently, changes in relationships and patterns of business dealing
are anticipated or precipitated by the appellate decision. The satura-
tion of the marketplace with standardized transactional forms re-
flects an effort to connect contract doctrine with business practices.
4 It is interesting to note that the Uniform Commercial Code, which is keyed to a
Mansfieldian philosophy of accommodation to the marketplace, is unsupported by sys-
tematic research of the Schlesinger variety. On the other hand, it has been suggested
that the Code's particularistic flexibility furnishes the courts with the opportunity to re-
solve conflicts "in a way that comports with what [the judge) finds to be the needs and
problems of that transaction context" Spiedel. Contract Law: Some Reflections Upon
Commercial Contract and the Judicial Process, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 474, 479 (1968). See
also Patterson & Schlesinger, Problems of Codification of Commercial Law, New York
Law Revision Commission Leg. Doc. No. 65A, 51-56, 57-74 (1955), reprinted in H.
READ, J. MACDONALD & J. FORDHAM, LEGISLATION 254-59 (2d ed. 1959).
5 L. FRiEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERicA 23-24 (1965).
6 At least in the insurance law area the separation has not been complete - contract
doctrine is frequently invoked.
7 Macaulay notes that legislative pre-emption may be temporary since "some of the
traditional ideas upon which old-fashioned classroom contract law is based, re-emerge to
govern these new statutes and their applicatons." S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BAL-
ANCE OF POWER 4 (1966).
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Many standardized forms have been developed by trade associations
that presumably are in touch with industry custom and which could
be expected to produce a product that is relevant to commercial
reality.'
The utility of the contract has not been overlooked by contem-
porary capitalists. Large amounts of resources can be tied up by
contract. For example, the franchise, a complex and highly inno-
vative product distribution system, relies heavily on contract as a
control device. Further, the conceptual and philosophical impor-
tance of contract has remained undiluted. Thus, while there ap-
pears to be evidential substance behind the sphere of influence
theory, it loses much of its force when related to this study. It is
doubtful if contract doctrine has lost its influence in international
trade or investment.
In arriving at a common core of contract formation the authors
adopted what they describe as "factual methodology." Fact situa-
tions, taken mainly from United States opinions. were distributed
among participants who were expected, within the framework of the
respective legal systems, to answer these three questions: Would
the verdict be for the plaintiff or defendant? What would be the
form of relief? What is the doctrinal basis for the decision? Con-
clusions were reached through four levels of analysis. First, overall
understanding of the fact situations was reached. Each participant
then responded in terms of his legal system. The responses - indi-
vidual or national reports - were then subjected to group scrutiny
and analysis. At this point the results were abstracted and organ-
ized into a common core of contract formation. Finally, the national
reports were revised to conform to common core conclusions.
The cornerstone of the factual approach is the universality of
the fact situations. The different shades of meaning and commer-
cial effects that facts might take on in -the various nations can ren-
der uniform comprehension difficult and, hence, conclusions mean-
ingless. The authors feel that by intra-group discussions and with
probing cross-examinations they have avoided this problem.
Whether they have succeeded depends upon several factors. First,
8 This does not mean that the provisions in the standardized forms are always uti-
lized. H. JONES, E. FARNSWORTH & W. YouNG, CoNRmAcrs 160 (1965). Ap-
parently the prime motivating force behind the use of standardized contracts was to
avoid "judicial risks." Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 631-32 (1943).
9 Of course, control by contract can reach the point where antitrust proscription ap-
pears on the scene. See, e.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961).
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the project commentators must possess a high degree of expertise
and familiarity with commercial practices in their countries. This
is, of course, a heavy burden. Secondly, variations in the effects of
facts from nation to nation must not prevail to the point that mean-
ingful abstraction is precluded. Finally, there is the problem of
whether the participant can relate the fact situation posed in the
working paper with a like fact situation in the appellate cases of the
individual legal systems.
Nevertheless, the authors are justified in their enthusiasm for the
factual method. It is an effective means of making readily discern-
ible the substantial differences in procedure, in legal philosophy,
and in decision-rendering style, which exists among nations. Prob-
lems of classification are exposed, making it possible to "cut right
through the conceptual cubicles in which each legal system stores its
law of contracts."' 10
Because of the use of factual methodology and comparative tech-
niques, the authors contend that the individual reports do not dupli-
cate in style, form, or substance the traditional Corbin-Williston
treatise or law review article treatment of contracts. The give and
take of discussions designed to establish patterns of agreement and
disagreement among 10 legal systems allegedly prompted illuminat-
ing questions that would not normally have been raised had one
commentator channelled his analytical energies toward a single
system.
If the authors mean that unanticipated questions were evoked
that shed new light on comparison techniques, they are perhaps cor-
rect. Moreover, there is no doubt as to the thoroughness and reach
of the reports, particularly the series of American reports. Scholar-
ship and competence of the highest level is clearly evident. But,
in overall substance and import the American reports are cast in the
classical treatise-law review article mold." Little appears that is
not already a familiar part of the literature of formation of con-
tracts.' 2 This does not, however, detract from the quality of the
project. The individual reports were intended to establish a founda-
tion that would ultimately culminate in a useful common core of
10 1 R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 57.
11 A law review article, MacNeil, Time of Acceptance; Too Many Problems For a
Single Rule, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 947 (1964), was reprinted as substantially the entire
American report on "When Acceptance Becomes Effective." 2 R. SCHLESINGER, supra
note 1, at 1395.
12 An interesting exception is the analysis of the contractural overtones of self-service
systems and vending machine transactions. 1 R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 336-42.
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abstractive conclusions. The foundation was established, the com-
mon core was extracted, and the product represents a meaningful
and significant contribution to contract law and the field of compar-
ative law.
ARTHUR D. AUSTIN*
THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR: JUDICIAL SELEC-
TION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT. PLAN. By
Richard A. Watson and Rondal G. Downing. New York, New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1969. Pp. xx, 393. $10.00.
The Nonpartisan Court Plan, first adopted by Missouri in
1940, was developed by the American Bar Association and the
American Judicature Society for the purpose of improving the
quality of state judiciaries through introduction into the selection
process of individuals who were acquainted with the criteria re-
quired for a "good judge."1 Under the Plan, a commission com-
posed of laymen, lawyers, and judges nominates three candidates
for each judicial vacancy. The governor then appoints one of the
nominees to the position. After a year's service each judge so se-
lected is required to run on his record (without opposition) for ap-
proval by the electorate. Proponents have argued that the Plan re-
moves the choice of judges from politics. Opponents have charged
that it results in conservative elitism on the bench. Glendon Schu-
bert, leading judicial behavioralist, calls the Plan a means by which
"the effective selection of judges is made through what amounts
to guild control by organizations run by lawyers." 2 Watson and
Downing in The Politics of the Bench and the Bar, now provide
the facts of the Plan's operation in one state political system, with
a powerful analysis of the selection process and its consequences.
As in all indirect representative processes, the essential ques-
tion is: Who selects the selectors? In Missouri, there are three
groups of selectors: the judicial commissions for the circuit courts
of Jackson County (Kansas City) and St. Louis respectively, and
an appellate commission for the courts of appeals and the state su-
preme court. For all three commissions, the lawyer members are
chosen by the organized Bar within the jurisdiction of the respec-
tive courts; the lay members are appointed by the governor; and
the judicial member, who acts as chairman of the nominating corn-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
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mission, is the presiding judge of the court of appeals in the area, or,
in the case of -the appellate commission, the chief justice of the
state supreme court.
The principal characteristic of the Bar elections is the keen
competition of a two-party subsystem operating within the legal
community. Social, economic, and professional differences have
led to political conflict over the lawyers' seats on the nominating
commissions so that rival bar associations in Kansas City and St.
Louis, representing different types of practices, have competed for
getting "their" kind of judges on the bench: "persons .. . who will
be sympathetic, or at least not hostile, to their clients' interests."'
The primary division among the members of the Bar in Missouri is
between plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers. The authors distin-
guish this competition from mere factionalism, because the oppos-
ing sides represent distinct interests in society, and both parties are
at various times successful.
Although the presence of lay members on the nominating com-
missions is -meant to signify public participation in the selection
process, citizens generally are too remote from the judicial process
.to create pressures on the governor's array of choices. Instead, the
governor tends to pay attention to the "attentive publics" of the
courts, principally lawyers, businesses affected by a large volume
of litigation, and his political party. With few exceptions, the lay
members have been businessmen with close ties to the local com-
munity, members of the governor's party, and often his close per-
sonal friends.
Once selected, the nominating commissions utilize a variety of
consensual techniques. Perhaps the most significant are the varia-
tions of the "panel-stacking game," whereby the final choice of
the judge is predetermined. For example, "rigging" provides a
combination of nominees which leaves the governor virtually no
choice: the commission simply nominates one political friend of
the governor, one political enemy within his own party, and a
1 The Plan has arisen from dissatisfaction with traditional methods of judicial selec-
tion such as direct election of judges by partisan ballot or gubernatorial appointment.
Both of these methods not only minimize the "good judge" criteria, but result in judici-
aries that may be responsive to those groups with whom the judges have been associated.
For a discussion of the potential effects of judicial affiliation with power groups, see
Comment, Partisan Values in the Lower Courts: Reapportionment in Ohio and
Michigan, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401 (1969).
2 G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING 27 (1965).
3R . WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR:
JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN 39 (1969).
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member of the other major party. Loading may force the gover-
nor to appoint someone he does not want, as -in the rare instance
when the appellate commission presented a Democratic governor,
known for his belief in rewarding -the party faithful, with a panel
of three Republicans. Finally, "wiring" occurs when the governor
lets his choice be known, directly or indirectly, to the commission,
which proceeds to name his candidate along with two others whose
selection is implicitly meaningless.4
To reach their conclusions the authors combined numerous em-
pirical methods of data collection5 to gather basic factual material
to which they applied the insights of the contemporary study of
political culture, systems analysis, and role theory. The significant
findings of the authors contradict the expectations of both oppo-
nents and proponents of this method of judicial selection. The
judges selected did not reflect elite characteristics or produce more
consistently conservative decisions than those selected in a previous
period by partisan election. Instead, Missouri Plan judges tended
to have been born in the state, to have received their legal educa-
tion there, often in local night law schools, and to be open-minded
and willing to listen to both sides of a case. Moreover, the process
did not remove politics from judicial selection, but changed its na-
ture in significant ways. First, the locus of political power now
lies with the governor, and his faction or party, rather than with
the party's county chairmen and local bosses who previously made
the decisions of the judicial nominating process. Secondly, the
Nonpartisan Plan appears to reflect the partisan composition of
the state, and its political culture. The proportion of judges of
the majority party of the state increased at both the circuit and ap-
pellate levels during the operation of the Plan."
Furthermore, the Plan does not appear to prevent representa-
tion of social, economic, and political values in the judiciary. The
"birthright" characteristics of commission members and judges are
not presented here, probably because of the difficulty of assem-
bling racial, ethnic, and religious data for a period reaching back
into the 1940's. For comparative purposes, these characteristics of
elective judges in a previous time span would have been desirable
to test the hypothesis of critics that the elite-oriented processes of
4 d. at 107-08.
5 Over 200 personal interviews were conducted with judges, lawyers, and politicians.
A sample survey included 1200 members of the Missouri Bar. Additionally, court de-
cisions were analyzed, and the statistics of Bar polls and judicial elections tabulated.
6Id. at 219.
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choice would tend to exclude minority group members from the
judiciary. However, if the dominant political culture of Missouri
is white, Democratic, Protestant, and traditionalistic,7 a pluralistic
judiciary would not tend to emerge from any method of selection.
In a more pluralistic political culture, where ethnic, racial, and re-
ligious minorities are significant participants in the politics of gu-
bernatorial elections, this study would lead us to predict that such
groups would secure representation in the judicial nominating and
appointing processes.
Watson and Downing have provided a vast mine of informa-
tion in The Politics of the Bench and the Bar. Nevertheless, their
study is more heuristic than definitive. The authors' impressive
achievement points the way to further comparative judicial studies
as well as to a more realistic assessment of the potential effect of
adoption of the Nonpartisan Court Plan in presently elective
states.
KATHLEEN L. BARBER*
SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EXEMPLAR FOR OPTIMAL DE-
CISION THEORY ANALYSIS. By James L. Hildebrand. Buffalo,
New York: William S. Hein & Co. 1969. Pp. xx, 130. $10.00.
This study of international law in the Soviet style represents an
excellent experiment in interdisciplinary analysis by James L. Hilde-
brand of Washington, D.C., a former student of mine. I first re-
viewed this work, which delineates Soviet international legal policy
from the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 through the most recent
Czechslovakian crisis, when it appeared in the November 1968 is-
sue of the Case Western Reserve Law Review. [See 55 A.B.A.J.
373 (1969)1 Since then it has been published in book form with
a challenging introduction entitled "Law and the Idea of Mankind"
by Harry W. Jones of Columbia University's School of Law.
By applying modern decision theory and traditional political sci-
ence, an understandable pattern is derived from the allegedly most
enigmatic Soviet policy moves. The Soviet heritage found in Czar-
7 Id. at 343.
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, John Carroll University in Cleveland,
Ohio.
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ist Russia's minimal contributions to traditional international law
is briefly discussed. The author then attacks the theoretical con-
cepts which give rise to the Soviet dilemma of reconciling Marxist
doctrine with .the predominantly Western-oriented body of inter-
national jurisprudence. The attempts of the various Soviet.legal
spokesmen (Korovin, Pashukanis, Vyshinski, and Tunkin) to
shorten the horns of this dilemma are outlined.
In 1956, with Khrushchev backing the theme of peaceful coex-
istence, a compromise of the divergent legal systems was acknowl-
edged by the Soviet international legal policy-makers. The shift,
from Khrushchev's coexistence theme to Brezhnev and Kosygin's
theme of cooperation, is discussed as a significant change not only
in terminology but in approach as well. "Indeed," the author points
out after a detailed, comprehensive analysis, "the current East-West
ddtente era has created a 'new' international law made up of consen-
sually-based rules." This analysis provides ground for suggesting
an operational sociological approach based on a transcultural con-
sensus as a potential solution to the dilemmas in international
jurisprudence which have been created by a world of polarized ideo-
logical beliefs.
Before espousing the concept of a transcultural consensus, the
author interjects a brief critical comparison "between the Soviet
'hang-ups' in effectuating a valid theory of international law and
the inconsistency between -the United States democratic ideals and
American international relations," as evidenced by our commitment
to the "rationally deductive" domino theory and our refusal to sign
the international human rights treaties. The transcultural consen-
sus, coupled with the policy-evaluation strategy of disjointed in-
crementalism, is then posited as a means for averting annihilation
of the human species because of misguided intraspecific aggression
(, la Lorenz) and the territorial imperative behavior pattern
( la Ardrey), both of which appear to be phylogenetically pro-
grammed into man's basically aggressive nature. The author stresses
the necessity for a mankind perspective transcending national val-
ues and prejudices.
This book appears to be on the forefront of new approaches to
international law for "this spaceship we call Earth." Its eclectic
coverage integrates game theory, modern optimal decision theory
and traditional concepts of political science and international law.
Not only is it authoritative political history and an outstanding con-
tribution to the growing legal literature on judicial behaviorism, it
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is also an important and comprehensive study of the crucial issues
that face mankind in the twentieth century.
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFE*
* Professor of Law, Catholic University of America School of Law. Editor, Reactions
to Current Legal Literature, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL.
